One of the reasons COVID‐19 caught the world by surprise is that biowarfare has been long outlawed and biological security has been seen as much less of an issue than, for example, anti‐terrorist security. In the wake of the epidemic in Russia, its only COVID‐19 testing laboratory was 'Vector', near the Siberian city of Novosibirsk. It was created in 1974 as part of a secret Soviet biowarfare project, a couple years after, and in violation of, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, which the Soviet Union had signed. The history of this laboratory draws attention, first, to the histories of secrecy that affect the biological warfare conspiracy theories that now circulate globally and, second, to un‐researched complexities of the political history of science and technology that underpin global biosecurity (or lack thereof) today.

Bio‐safety level‐4 laboratories awe the public. There are only 50 such laboratories in the world, working with deadly pathogens in an atmosphere of secrecy. The beginning of the current pandemic was accompanied by a 'theory' about Wuhan Institute of Virology as a disease source. We don't know if Wuhan Institute conducts the secret research it was accused of, but we know that 30 years ago the Soviet centre for virology and microbiology, Vector, did. Yet, if traditionally this Soviet biological weapons project was considered within the field of security studies, with main characters of such narratives being the state, politicians and generals, this history also reveals the complexities of scientists' agency.

The USSR signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972. Yet in 1973 the Soviet biowarfare project was launched. An organisation, 'Biopreparat', was created that consisted of 40 laboratories and plants, and more than 10,000 staff. In 1974 one of its key research centres was established near Novosibirsk, the All‐Union Research Institute of Molecular Biology, subsequently named 'Vector'. Headed by Lev Sandakchiev, its biologists started to work with dangerous pathogens and to modify them for military offence purposes.

The circumstances that surround the decision to violate the 1973 convention and start a biological weapons programme are still unknown. Yet memoirs of some Biopreparat specialists and testimonies of subsequent top‐level defectors point to the academic roots of this project. Ken Alibek, former Biopreparat top official, noticed that it was biochemist Yury Ovchinnikov who had written a letter to the Party Central Committee suggesting to start biowarfare research. He was inspired by western genetics. Soviet genetics was politically prohibited until 1965, so existing geneticists could only dream of this level of research. Ovchinnikov saw an opportunity to develop biology through military genetics. The Biopreparat programme meant unlimited funding, new equipment, foreign fellowships. This came, however, at a cost of research independence and publication freedom. The Soviet biowarfare project stayed secret for 16 years. In 1989, Vladimir Pasechnik, the director of one of the Biopreparat research institutes, defected to Britain and revealed the programme in which he participated. He told journalists he defected on moral grounds. Scandal was about to break. But Western leaders didn't want to weaken the perestroika. It was only Yeltsin who in 1992 forbade biowarfare activities.

From the 1990s, Vector became a research centre similar to the American Center for Disease Control in Atlanta. The same Lev Sandakchiev converted Vector's facilities to develop vaccines against measles, influenza, hepatitis, smallpox, Ebola and Marburg viruses. Sandakchiev also provided unprecedented openness to international biological weapons inspections. Now this centre is an important part of the Russian effort against COVID‐19.
